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An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) was detected in Singapore at the beginning of
March 2003. The outbreak, initiated by a traveler to Hong
Kong in late February 2003, led to sequential spread of
SARS to three major acute–care hospitals in Singapore.
Critical factors in containing this outbreak were early detec-
tion and complete assessment of movements and follow-up
of patients, healthcare workers, and visitors who were con-
tacts. Visitor records were important in helping identify
exposed persons who could carry the infection into the
community. In the three hospital outbreaks, three different
containment strategies were used to contain spread of
infection: closing an entire hospital, removing all potentially
infected persons to a dedicated SARS hospital, and man-
aging exposed persons in place. On the basis of this expe-
rience, if a nosocomial outbreak is detected late, a hospital
may need to be closed in order to contain spread of the dis-
ease. Outbreaks detected early can be managed by either
removing all exposed persons to a designated location or
isolating and managing them in place.
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has been
characterized by efficient transmission in healthcare
facilities, highlighting the vulnerability of our modern
healthcare system to nosocomial infection (1,2). Frequent
unprotected or inadequately protected patient-to-health-
care worker interactions (3) and grouping large numbers of
ill persons can greatly amplify intrahospital transmission.
If uncontrolled, SARS outbreaks in hospitals may rapidly
degrade hospital services and can increase the risk for
infection spread into the general community. Hence, rapid
and effective containment of hospital SARS outbreaks is
important.
In Singapore, an outbreak of SARS was started when a
traveler (patient A) visited Hong Kong during February 20
to 25, 2003 (4). Patient A returned to Singapore and was
admitted to an acute care hospital, Tan Tock Seng Hospital
(TTSH), on March 1. Singapore was removed from the
World Health Organization’s list of areas with local SARS
transmission on May 31. At that time, 206 probable SARS
cases had been diagnosed, of which 40.8% were in health-
care workers; 39.8% were in family, friends, or visitors to
hospitals; and 12.2% were in inpatients.
The outbreak in TTSH spread to two other tertiary hos-
pitals (Singapore General Hospital [SGH], and National
University Hospital [NUH]) despite initial containment
efforts (Figure 1). The initial failure of the containment
strategy was compounded by the presence, early in the out-
break, of three superspreading events, i.e., SARS patients
directly associated with 10 or more secondary infections
each. The Table summarizes the profile of the outbreak in
the three hospitals. To contain the outbreak in Singapore,
we used three separate hospital strategies: 1) closing the
hospital, 2) removing an exposed group to a designated
hospital, and 3) managing an exposed cohort in place. We
review the three hospital containment strategies and the
effectiveness of these strategies. 
Sequential SARS Outbreaks
TTSH Cluster
The index case-patient, patient A, was admitted to
TTSH, a 1,400-bed hospital, on March 1, 2003 for atypical
pneumonia. She was treated in a six-bed ward (ward 5A)
until she was isolated on March 6. 
During the 6 days patient A was in ward 5A, 24 of her
primary contacts were infected, and subsequently proba-
ble SARS developed in all. These included eight nurses,
one health attendant, five patients in the same ward, and
10 visitors. 
A second superspreading event occurred when one of
the nurses infected by patient A, patient AA, was admitted
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 10, No. 3, March 2004 395
SARS Transmission and Hospital
Containment
Gowri Gopalakrishna,* Philip Choo,† Yee Sin Leo,† Boon Keng Tay,‡ Yean Teng Lim,§ 
Ali S. Khan,¶1 and Chorh Chuan Tan*
*Ministry of Health, Singapore; †Tan Tock Seng Hospital,
Singapore; ‡Singapore General Hospital, Singapore; §National
University Hospital, Singapore; and ¶Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
1Short-term consultant, Global Outbreak and Alert Response
Network (GOARN), World Health Organizationto an open ward (8A) on March 10. Patient AA was isolat-
ed on March 13, by which time 25 persons (12 healthcare
workers, four patients in the same ward, eight visitors, and
one household contact) had been infected. One of these
patients (patient AAA) had multiple medical problems,
including diabetes, gram-negative bacteremia, and
ischemic heart disease that required her admission to the
coronary care unit (CCU) from March 12 to 19. Patient
AAAwas not isolated for 8 days, resulting in a third super-
spreading event. Because of her multiple medical prob-
lems, SARS infection was not suspected, and healthcare
workers caring for her did not use N95 masks. Twenty-
seven people at the CCU were infected, including five doc-
tors, 13 nurses, one ultrasonographer, one attendant, two
cardiac technicians, and five visitors. 
In addition to the spread of SARS within TTSH, infec-
tion also spread outside by infected visitors and discharged
patients to household contacts and healthcare workers in
another hospital, Changi General Hospital. The failure to
detect SARS in a discharged patient (patient B) who was a
contact of patient A in TTSH led to a second major out-
break in SGH, where this patient was subsequently read-
mitted (Figure 2).
Public Health Response 
On March 15, probable SARS was diagnosed in a total
of 13 persons, all of whom were admitted to TTSH. Six of
these case-patients were family members and friends of
patient A, six were healthcare workers who had attended to
patient A in ward 5A, while one was a healthcare worker
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Table. Key features of the outbreak in Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore General Hospital, and National University Hospital 
Features 
Tan Tock Seng Hospital 
(N = 109) 
Singapore General Hospital 
(N = 60) 
National University Hospital 
(N = 10) 
Index case-patient       
Age (y)  22  60  64 
Symptoms/diagnosis  Fever, headache, cough, patchy 
right infiltrate 
Gastrointestinal bleeding, 
diabetic foot ulcer 
Fever, increasing shortness of 
breath, hypotension 
Time from admission to isolation (d)  6  10  1 
Healthcare workers with probable SARS (%)
a       
Doctors  8 (7)  3 (5)  1 (10) 
Nurses  35 (32)  21 (35)  2 (20) 
Ancillary caregivers
b  3 (3)  6 (10)  0 
Others
c  3 (3)  10 (17)  0 
No. of superspreading events  3 (including patient A)  1  1 
Average time from onset to isolation (days)  4.6  2.6  1 
Age (%)       
<20 y  10 (9)  0 (0)  1 (10) 
20–29 y  40 (37)  7 (11)  4 (40) 
30–39 y  25 (23)  13 (24)  1 (10) 
40–49 y  11 (10)  10 (16)  0 
50–59 y  15 (14)  11 (18)  0 
>60 y  8 (7)  19 (31)  4 (40) 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
bIncludes technicians, radiographers, and sonographers. 
cIncludes ward clerks, housekeepers, porters, and healthcare attendants. 
Figure 1. Severe acute respiratory syndrome
case-patients infected at three major hospitals,
Singapore, February–April 2003. The chart
depicts the overall epidemic in each hospital,
includes case-patients infected outside the
hospital but whose disease origin was linked
back to one of the three hospital outbreaks. In
Tan Tock Seng Hospital (green), the last case
of intrahospital transmission was on April 12. In
Singapore General Hospital (red), the last case
of intrahospital transmission was on April 15. In
National University Hospital (blue), the last
case of intrahospital transmission was on April
25. Arrows indicate dates of onsets of the three
index cases for each hospital outbreak. Dotted
arrow indicates date when full infection control
measures (Figure 2) were implemented in Tan
Tock Seng Hospital.from the CCU who had attended to patient AAA. In addi-
tion, TTSH was aware of five healthcare workers who
were on medical leave for fever, four of whom were from
ward 5A and one from ward 8A. Probable SARS subse-
quently developed in these five healthcare workers. 
Probable SARS patients were isolated and their con-
tacts were traced. Symptomatic contacts were isolated
while asymptomatic contacts were advised to seek medical
attention if they became ill. Infection control precautions
were also enhanced in TTSH, including providing separate
triage facilities for patients with suspected SARS who may
seek treatment at emergency departments and requiring
healthcare workers (in the emergency department, inten-
sive-care unit [ICU], isolation wards, triage points, and
wards which had been exposed to patients with possible
SARS) to wear personal protective equipment consisting
of N95 masks, gowns, and gloves. By March 21, approxi-
mately 30 probable SARS cases had been reported, of
which half were healthcare workers. Persons in at least six
wards and the CCU in TTSH had been exposed, but those
in additional wards could have been exposed due to move-
ments of infected healthcare workers. Therefore, on March
22, the decision was made to close TTSH’s normal opera-
tions and dedicate the hospital solely to treating probable
and suspected SARS case-patients (Figure 2). In line with
this decision, all healthcare workers in the hospital adopt-
ed the use of N95 masks, gowns, and gloves at all times. A
strict regimen (3x/day) of temperature surveillance of all
staff was also instituted on March 21, with the aim of iden-
tifying affected staff as early as possible and isolating them
immediately. The hospital limited visitors; visits to SARS
case-patients were initially permitted, but visitors were
required to use personal protective equipment (i.e., N95
masks, gowns, and gloves). Visitors to other ward areas
were asked to use surgical masks. Non-SARS patients
were discharged if they had no known exposure to SARS.
Figure 2 summarizes the timeline of events in the outbreak
and the key control measures instituted. 
Outcome
The intrahospital transmission of SARS in TTSH was
controlled within 3 weeks of instituting the measures
(Figure 1). In retrospect, if more drastic measures had been
implemented on March 15 (when SARS was recognized as
the outbreak’s cause), the containment of SARS infection
in TTSH and Singapore could have been accelerated. In
containing the TTSH outbreak, the inability to rapidly and
completely identify all exposed persons was a major prob-
lem, mainly due to the absence of visitor records and the
high frequency and complexity of patient-healthcare work-
er contacts and movements. Healthcare workers were also
not using full personal protective equipment for most of
that time. 
If all contacts of the initial SARS case-patients detect-
ed on March 15 had been identified, patient AAA could
have been cared for in isolation in CCU by staff with full
personal protective equipment. At least 22 of the 27 case-
patients infected by patient AAA in the CCU possibly
could have been prevented. 
The discharge of patient B from the same ward in
TTSH as patient A was another factor which led infection
to spread to SGH. Patient B had not been identified as a
contact of patient A at that time and was subsequently
readmitted to an open ward in SGH. In retrospect, we think
that if all discharges from affected areas in TTSH had been
stopped on March 15, the 60 probable SARS cases in SGH
linked to patient B might have been prevented.
In-depth interviews to determine the epidemiologic link
of SARS case-patients that arose after March 15 indicated
that at least 17 of them visited TTSH areas where initial
cases arose. If a no-visitor policy had been implemented in
TTSH on March 15, at least 17 new SARS cases outside of
TTSH could theoretically have been prevented.
SGH Cluster
The index case-patient in SGH was patient B, who did
not exhibit typical signs and symptoms of SARS. Patient B
was admitted to an open ward, ward 57, in SGH on March
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Figure 2. Timeline of events in the outbreak of
SARS in the three acute hospitals, Singapore
March–May 2003. SARS, severe acute respirato-
ry syndrome; TTSH, Tan Tock Seng Hospital; ED,
emergency department; PPE, personal protec-
tive equipment (defined as a test-fitted N95
mask, gowns, and gloves; goggles if dealing with
suspicious cases; powered air purified respira-
tors for high-risk procedures such as intubation);
ICU, intensive care unit; high-risk area defined as
ED, ICU, isolation wards; SGH, Singapore
General Hospital; NUH, National University
Hospital; HCW, healthcare worker. aStaff found to
have a temperature >37.5°C were given medical
leave for 3 days with a review on the third day.
a24 for gastrointestinal bleeding. A fever attributed to an
Escherichia coli urinary tract infection developed on
March 26. On March 29, he was transferred to an adjacent
open ward, ward 58, where he remained until April 2. He
was transferred to the diagnostic radiology department
twice, on April 1 and 2, respectively. Results of repeated
chest x-rays were normal until shadowing in the right
lower zone and left perihilar region was noted on April 5.
The SGH outbreak was identified on April 4 (Figure 2)
when fever developed in a cluster of 13 healthcare work-
ers. The cluster (one doctor, 11 nurses, and one radiogra-
pher) was detected because temperatures of all healthcare
workers in SGH were monitored 3x/day. All 13 healthcare
workers had attended to patient B; probable SARS devel-
oped in all 13. In total, the SGH outbreak resulted in 60 (24
healthcare workers, 11 inpatients, two outpatients, 12 visi-
tors and 11 household contacts) probable SARS cases. 
Public Health Response
The public health response was based on two key con-
siderations. First, with 1,600 beds, SGH is the largest acute
hospital in Singapore. With TTSH, the second largest acute
hospital, dedicated as a SARS hospital, authorities could
not shut down SGH as well. Second, the epidemiologic
assessment was that the outbreak was localized. All SARS
cases came from wards 57 and 58. Symptom onset for the
13 affected healthcare workers was March 31 for one case-
patient, April 2 for three case-patients, April 3 for four
case-patients, and April 4 for five case-patients. Most
importantly, in line with SGH’s standing rule, no affected
healthcare workers came to work when they had fever.
There was no evidence of secondary transmission. 
The key containment strategy in the SGH was to com-
pletely remove exposed patients and healthcare workers
to TTSH, the designated SARS hospital. Three main
groups of patients were identified who might have been
exposed to SARS in wards 57 and 58 during the “hot”
period (i.e., when patient B was admitted on March 24 to
the time his contacts were identified and transferred to
TTSH on April 5). 
The first group identified was the 80 patients in wards
57 and 58 on April 5. Next identified were a total of 135
patients admitted to the two affected wards during the hot
period and subsequently transferred to three other wards in
SGH. These three wards were subjected to a no-admission,
no-discharge policy, and the two groups of patients were
transferred to TTSH. The third group was 386 patients who
had been in wards 57 and 58 in the hot period but had been
discharged. None of these patients had fever, and all were
called by phone 3x/day for 10 days. 
Medical staff members in wards 57 and 58 were sent to
TTSH to care for the transferred patients. An additional
236 SGH healthcare workers who had been in contact with
exposed healthcare workers from the two wards were quar-
antined for 10 days. 
Outcome 
Containment measures controlled intrahospital infec-
tion spread within 10 days. Of the exposed patients and
healthcare workers transferred to TTSH, probable SARS
developed in eight. All were infected before the transfer.
However, two shortcomings affected the containment
strategy. First was the failure to fully trace back the index
case-patient’s (patient B’s) movement in the hospital. As a
result, two exposed clinical areas were missed in the ini-
tial containment strategy. These areas were recognized
when 11 additional cases were detected in two new areas
in SGH: the diagnostic radiology department and a terti-
ary cancer facility, National Cancer Centre (NCC). Patient
B had been in the diagnostic radiology department on
April 1, where two healthcare assistants, two outpatients,
and one visitor were infected. During patient B’s second
visit to the radiology department on April 2, an additional
two healthcare workers who attended to him were infect-
ed. Fortunately, the cases were detected early because of
SGH’s strict 3x/day temperature monitoring regimen for
all staff. In addition, all healthcare workers had begun
using test-fitted N95 masks in all settings, including staff
meetings and briefings. These steps helped mitigate fur-
ther transmission of infection by healthcare workers.
Unfortunately, one healthcare worker in the radiology
area was given medical leave when she became febrile.
She had close contact with some friends while on medical
leave, leading to infection in three of them, one of whom
infected four family members.
The second, more serious shortcoming arose because
visitors to the two affected wards during the hot period
were not completely traced. Patient B was visited by his
brother, patient C, at SGH on March 31. Eight days after
the visit, symptoms of SARS developed in patient C, who
was admitted to an open ward in NUH. 
NUH Cluster
Patient C sought treatment at the emergency depart-
ment of NUH on April 8 (Figure 2). He remained in the
emergency department for approximately 4 hours before
being transferred to an open ward, ward 64, where he
remained for about 8 hours before being intubated and
transferred to the ICU. He remained isolated in the ICU
until the morning of April 9 when he was transferred to
TTSH; probable SARS was diagnosed after a complete
history of contact was elicited. 
Public Health Response
The NUH outbreak was identified on April 11 when a
doctor who had attended to patient C was noted to have
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was isolating exposed persons (closing the exposed ward,
stopping all new admissions and discharges to the ward for
a period of 10 days, and isolating exposed patients). Staff
members were put on work quarantine (i.e., they continued
to work but were quarantined after work in separate quar-
ters) and 3x/day temperature monitoring. 
Outcome
As a result of these measures, when fever developed in
two nurses 2 days after the outbreak, they were quickly
recognized and isolated the same day. Fever developed in
five inpatients in ward 64, who were transferred to TTSH.
Two of these five inpatients had direct contact with patient
B, and infections in the other three were likely acquired
either from one of the infected healthcare workers or inpa-
tients. The last probable SARS case from this ward was
detected on April 25. 
The shortcoming in this containment strategy was the
failure to identify all the exposed visitors, one of whom
had come into contact with patient C on April 8. This vis-
itor was unidentified until probable SARS developed on
April 11, by which time two family contacts had been
infected. 
Discussion
In the sequential SARS outbreaks, the three acute hos-
pitals used different key containment strategies. On the
basis of this experience, three key factors must be consid-
ered when deciding on the appropriate containment
response. First, has the outbreak has been detected early?
Second, can the likely source of the infection cluster be
rapidly identified? Third, can a complete list of all contacts
be obtained within 48 hours?
In our experience, if an outbreak is recognized early
(within one incubation period and no evidence of second-
ary transmission on careful contact tracing) and the source
identified and isolated expeditiously, the outbreak can
probably be contained by closing the ward or clinical area,
isolating all patients in the ward, and quarantining health-
care workers and visitors who have been in the ward. The
NUH outbreak focused on this as its central containment
strategy. The key was identifying and isolating patient C
early. Patient C was in NUH for <12 hours before being
isolated; hence, the number of exposed persons was man-
ageable, and contacts could be identified with a high
degree of confidence.
If, however, the outbreak is detected late (i.e., beyond
1–2 incubation periods, when secondary cases have
occurred among staff and inpatients and multiple wards
have been exposed), the most prudent course in our view
is to close the hospital and place all healthcare workers on
work quarantine as an immediate measure, while conduct-
ing epidemiologic investigations and implementing con-
tainment measures. We would generally consider an out-
break detected late if >1 maximum incubation period
(10 days) elapsed before the outbreak was recognized. For
example, the outbreak in TTSH was detected 14 days after
the admission of patient A. In retrospect, by this time, sec-
ondary transmission in different parts of the hospital was
indicated by the fact that SARS was diagnosed in a house-
hold contact of patient AA and a healthcare worker who
attended to patient AAA in the CCU. 
All patient admissions and discharges should be
stopped. Acomplete list of all SARS patient contacts needs
to be generated within 48 hours and those contacts quaran-
tined or kept under medical surveillance, e.g., 3x/day tele-
phone calls by a nurse. Otherwise SARS infection could
rapidly spread to other healthcare facilities.
If closing the whole hospital is not possible, we believe
that transferring all exposed persons to a designated SARS
facility is the next best option. We have observed that run-
ning normal hospital services is difficult while managing a
large number of patients with SARS or exposure to SARS.
Scarcity of available beds may lead to transferring exposed
patients prematurely out of isolation facilities into general
wards, risking continued infection transmission. In addi-
tion, transferring all exposed persons out of the affected
hospital allows it to carry on normal services as much as
possible. 
This containment strategy was adopted for the SGH
outbreak and resulted in controlling intrahospital infection
spread within 10 days. Movements of the index case-
patient should be investigated to ensure that all exposed
persons are quarantined. In the SGH outbreak, failing to
identify the NCC and radiology departments as exposed
areas led to missing exposed healthcare workers and
patient contacts, and a small cluster of 11 secondary cases
arose as a result. 
Contact History
Patients’contact history must be reviewed carefully for
contact with SARS patients. Because the contact history
for both patients B and C was not thoroughly obtained at
admission, they were not isolated, resulting in the SARS
outbreaks in SGH and NUH, respectively. 
Fever Surveillance of Healthcare Workers
In Singapore, all hospitals were required to establish a
system of three times a day temperature surveillance of
staff. In hospitals affected by SARS, temperatures were
checked by designated staff and recorded. In other hospi-
tals, staff could check and report their own temperatures.
Temperature surveillance covered all healthcare workers,
including healthcare attendants, cleaners, and contract staff
who worked in clinical areas. Healthcare workers were not
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healthcare worker with fever for >3 days or occurring as
part of a cluster of cases was isolated. When more than two
staff members or patients in a clinical area were febrile,
epidemiologic investigation was initiated.
In our experience, fever surveillance among healthcare
workers rapidly identified potentially infected healthcare
workers in hospitals with SARS outbreaks. In the SGH
outbreak, fever surveillance enabled the rapid detection of
7 of the healthcare worker probable cases that arose from
the NCC and radiology departments. Similarly in the NUH
outbreak, temperature surveillance identified two ward 64
nurses who were isolated the same day. 
Personal Protective Equipment
On the basis of our and others’experiences (5), the non-
specific symptoms of SARS make identifying potential
cases difficult. Strictly adhering to the use of personal pro-
tective equipment by healthcare workers mitigated spread
in all three outbreaks. 
Visitor Records
In all three hospital outbreaks, visitors contributed sub-
stantially to SARS transmission. At least 21 cases resulted
from spread by hospital visitors to family and community
contacts. This type of transmission emphasizes the impor-
tance of maintaining a visitor log and limiting visitors. In
Singapore, a no-visitor policy in all public hospitals was
implemented 2 weeks after detecting the NUH outbreak.
Similar restrictions on hospital visitors were implemented
as control measures in outbreaks elsewhere (5). 
Better Preparedness 
The outbreak in TTSH was central to spreading infec-
tion to the other two hospitals. Key difficulties in contain-
ing the TTSH outbreak were: 1) late recognition of
disease, 2) lack of understanding of the disease, 3) inade-
quate infrastructure to support outbreak management of
this scale, 4) lack of ability to identify atypical cases, and
5) lack of understanding of superspreading events. 
Some of these difficulties can be overcome by better
planning and preparedness. However, a large part of an
effective response will rely on thoroughly understanding
the disease. In Singapore, we tried to develop a better
response capability through several means. The first com-
ponent was prevention through the use of N95 masks,
gowns, and gloves by healthcare workers in high-risk clin-
ical areas and triaging febrile patients at emergency depart-
ments and outpatient clinics, followed by isolating
infectious patients early. The second component was
detecting possible SARS clusters early through surveil-
lance for clusters of febrile healthcare workers or patients.
The third component was ensuring that all hospitals have
established and tested systems to rapidly generate a com-
plete list of all potential healthcare workers, patients, and
visitor contacts. These components should be part of a hos-
pital preparedness plan.
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